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ABSTRACT 
Quantitative methods for reasoning under uncertainty have become well established, and 
many alternative formalisms have been suggested. In recent years there has been a growing 
interest in qualitative methods as helpful in situations in which the use of precise numerical 
methods is not app ropriate. In this paper we demonstrate another use for qualitative models. 
The qualitative analysis of a quantitative model of uncertainty will reveal the qualitative 
behavior of that model when new evidence is obtained. This qualitative behavior may be 
studied to identify those situations in which the model does not behave as expected, and 
which quantitative values must be altered to correct his behavior. The demonstration is set 
within the context of the diagnosis of faults in an electricity network, and reports the results 
of the verification of a model representing a small fragment of a real application. The model 
was built using Pulcinella, a tool based on Shenoy and Shafer's valuation systems. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The handling of uncertainty within artificial intelligence systems has long been 
recognized as a topic worthy of investigation. Over two decades of research as 
resulted in the availability of a large number of formalisms intended for model- 
ing different aspects of uncertainty. This work has dealt largely with complex 
quantitative models such as probability theory [1], possibility theory [2, 3], and 
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evidence theory [4]. More recently, however, there has been considerable interest 
in the qualitative representation f reasoning under uncertainty in networks, in- 
cluding qualitative probabilistic networks [5-8] as well as qualitative possibilistic 
and evidential networks [9, 10]. 
At the same time there has been an increase in interest in the problem of find- 
ing a unified approach to handling uncertainty, and the view that the different 
formal models provide exclusive approaches has been challenged by a number 
of authors, including Szolovits and Pauker [11], Fox [12], Saffiotti [13], Krause 
and Clark [14], and Neapolitan [15]. Instead the view that these formalisms are 
alternatives from which the most appropriate may be taken in any given situation 
is advanced. Such a position has been supported by the development of a gener- 
alized approach to propagating uncertainty measures in networks [16, 17], from 
which a general purpose tool, known as Pulcinella, for propagating uncertainty by 
local computation has been developed [18]. This tool has been used [19, 20] to 
investigate he modeling of various reasoning problems using different uncertainty 
handling formalisms, thus providing acomparison of the different ways in which 
the formalisms behave, and adding to our knowledge of their relative usefulness 
for solving particular problems. 
In this paper we extend two of the lines of work mentioned above, by using 
qualitative methods [9] to advance the work of Saffiotti and Umkehrer [19], and 
by analyzing the qualitative behavior of the different formalisms when they are 
used to represent a particular problem. This information can then be used, in con- 
junction with expert opinion as to how the models of the problem should behave, 
to detect anomalies in those models, and, if any are found, to correct hem. The 
structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the problem 
which we are using in this case study, along with the models in various formalisms 
suggested in previous work [19, 20]. Section 3 then draws upon previous results 
to suggest how the models may be qualitatively analyzed. Section 4 uses the 
results of the qualitative analysis to verify the correctness of the models, and to 
detect some apparent anomalies. Finally Section 5 demonstrates how anomalies 
can be corrected, again making use of the qualitative analysis. Thus we suggest a
procedure for verification and debugging: 
1. Establish the qualitative behavior of an uncertain model, whatever formalism 
is being used. 
2. Verify that this behavior is as required, and detect any anomalies that occur. 
3. Alter the model, if necessary, to ensure that the behavior is correct. 
The use of this procedure is illustrated using a real problem. 
2. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
This section describes a problem in the domain of electricity distribution, re- 
ported in previous work [19, 20]. We present he three solutions originally 
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proposed [19], and illustrate our method of qualitative debugging by analyzing 
these solutions. 
2.1. Domain Knowledge 
The problem under study is to adequately model the uncertainty present in fault 
diagnosis in electricity networks. For the sake of clarity, both the structure of the 
problem and its quantitative knowledge have been greatly simplified. We consider 
here the fragment of an electricity network given in Figure 1. 
This fragment comprises four substations, linked by three lines L 1, L2 and 
L3 (in the real network, the three outer substations would be connected to other 
lines, substations, and so on). The substation in the middle includes S1, a big 
conductive bar, known as a busbar, used for connecting lines together. The Dis 
and D1 is are circuit breakers, that is, devices which watch the part of the network 
on their "hot" side, marked by a dot in the picture, for overloads. If an overload 
is detected on a line, a circuit breaker isolates this line and transmits an alarm to 
the control room. The alarm may be either an instantaneous alarm or a delayed 
alarm. An instantaneous alarm is generated when a big overload is detected, and 
is normally caused by a fault in the line that the device is monitoring. A delayed 
alarm is generated by a small overload normally caused in an adjacent line to that 
being monitored. However, a delayed alarm may also be caused by an overload 
in the line being monitored if the overload occurs at a considerable distance from 
the circuit breaker. Overloads in the busbar S1 are detected in just the same way 
as faults in lines, that is, an alarm from the outer circuit breakers D1-D3 may 
indicate a fault in S1. Note that a single fault can generate alarms in several circuit 
breakers. 
Talking to domain experts revealed that the behavior of the circuit breakers 
exhibits uncertainty, which has been roughly quantified by the experts: 
1. alarms are not very reliable: in roughly 10% of the cases, they do not cor- 
respond to the real situation, so that alarms are generated without faults or 
faults occur without alarms; 
i i__"~'~! ,D l l   . . .K  , "FLM~ [ 
. . . .  1 . . . . . . . . . .  
ID13 ....... j 
Figure 1. The relevant fragment of the distribution etwork. 
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2. if an instantaneous alarm is generated (correctly) on a circuit breaker, the 
fault is in the line that the breaker is on; 
3. if a delayed alarm is generated (correctly) on a circuit breaker, the fault is in 
the line that the breaker is on in roughly 30% of cases, and in an adjacent 
line in roughly 70%. 
In the fragment we are modeling, the "adjacent line" is the busbar S1 for the outer 
circuit breakers (i.e., D1, D2, D3), while it is some line outside our fragment 
for the inner circuit breakers (D 11, D 12, D 13). Accordingly, we know what the 
qualitative behavior of the modeled fragment should be (no matter what formalism 
is used to model the uncertainty): 
1. an instantaneous alarm in an outer circuit breaker should increase our belief 
in the occurrence of a fault in the line that the breaker is on; 
2. a delayed alarm in an outer circuit breaker should increase our belief in the 
occurrence of a fault either in the line the breaker is on, or in the busbar; 
3. an alarm (of any kind) in an inner circuit breaker should only increase our 
belief in the occurrence of a fault in the line the breaker is on (in the real 
network, a delayed alarm would also indicate a fault in another part of the 
network). 
2.2. Modeling the Problem 
We model our problem using Shenoy and Shafer's valuation system formalism 
[ 16, 17], which is a general approach to network-based local computation, inwhich 
many uncertainty handling formalisms can be embedded. The tool we have used for 
our experiment, Pulcinella,1 is an implementation f valuation systems that exhibits 
the same generality. Thanks to this generality, we have been able to use quantitative 
models of uncertainty as different as probability theory, possibility theory, and the 
Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions. As one must when using the valuation 
system formalism, we model our problem through aset of variables and a set of val- 
uations linking sets of related variables. Figure 2 shows a graphical representation 
of the model, where ovals stand for variables, and rectangles for valuations. 
A valuation over a set of variables expresses information about he values taken 
by the variables in that set, in a form that depends upon the uncertainty formal- 
ism; typically, this information is either a relation between those variables, or 
prior information about some variable. In the experiment reported here, we have 
modeled uncertain relations using three alternative formalisms: probability theory, 
possibility theory [2, 3], and the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions [4]. 2 
I pulcinella [18] was developed atIRIDIA, Universit6 Libre de Bruxelles, and is freely available for 
noncommercial use. More details are available on the Pulcinella web page, h t tp : / / i r id ia .  
ulb. ac.be/pulcinella/. 
2 A quick introduction to the use of  each of these formalisms in the context of the experiment described 
here can be found elsewhere [20]. 





Figure 2, The valuation system for the distribution network. 
The Dis and Dlis are variables representing circuit breaker states, with possible 
values ok (no alarm), del (delayed alarm), and inst (instantaneous alarm); Lis and 
S1 represent line and busbar states, with possible values ok and fault; and the 
alarm-is relate generation of alarms by breakers with states of neighboring lines. 
Once new information about he state of a breaker is received, this can be propa- 
gated through the alarm-i relations to produce updated estimates of the states of 
the various elements of the network (see [16] for more details on the propagation 
mechanism). 
In order to build the alarm-i valuations so that they behave as described above, 
we first split them into two groups: those referring to outer circuit breakers (alarm- 
1, alarm-2, alarm-3), and those referring to inner circuit breakers (alarm-l , 
alarm-12, alarm-13). We then enter the corresponding values. These values 
are meant o encode the three informal items of expert knowledge presented in 
Section 2.1 above. Tables 1-3 show the values for the two classes of valuations in 
each formalism. 3 In the probability case (Table 1), we use joint probability distri- 
butions. (For the user's convenience, these distributions are given unnormalized 
to Pulcinella, and then normalized by the program.) The incomplete information 
given by the experts had to be integrated by "reasonable" assumptions: for ex- 
ample, in the first column of the inner breaker case, the information "if no alarm 
is received, then L 1 is ok with 90% probability" has been split equally between 
the possibilities "L1 = ok and S1 = fault" and "L1 = ok and SI = ok" (as the 
inner circuit breakers do not give any information about possible faults in the bus- 
bar). And in the case of outer breakers, the information about he 90% reliability of 
3The reader may not agree that his is the "best" way to model the given problem. This, of course, 
is not the point here, our aim being to illustrate the use of qualitative t chniques to analyze and 
debug a possibly unsound model. In this respect, the interest ofthe proposed model is that it could 
be regarded--and indeed it has been--by a knowledge engineer as a plausible model for the given 
problem. 
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Table 1. The Joint Probability Distributions for the 
alarm-i Valuations 
Inner breakers (Dli) P(.) Outer breakers (Di) 
ok del inst L l S l ok del inst 
0.45 0.05 0.05 ok ok 0.89 0.1 0.05 
0.45 0.05 0.05 ok fault 0.05 0.6 0.05 
0.05 0.89 0.89 fault ok 0.05 0.2 0.89 
0.05 0.01 0.01 fault fault 0.001 0.1 0.01 
Table 2. The Joint Possibility Distributions for the 
alarm-i Valuations 
Inner breakers (Dli) 13(.) Outer breakers (Di) 
ok del inst L 1 S 1 ok del inst 
1 0.1 0.1 ok ok 1 0.1 0.1 
1 0.1 0.1 ok fault 0.1 0.7 0.3 
0.1 I 1 fault ok 0.1 0.3 1 
O.l 1 1 fault fault 0.1 1 1 
Table 3. The Joint Belief Distributions for the alarm-i Relations 
Inner circuit breaker 
, • . sL•  ok ok fault f~ull D I ~  ok l't ull 
0.9 
0.7 
Outer circuit breaker 
alarms, and that about he relative probability of faults in L 1 and S 1 given a delayed 
alarm, have been combined into the distributions shown in the second column. It 
appears that filling a probability table given the available xpert knowledge may 
require a good deal of artistic creation. 
The values are much less surprising for the possibilistic case, that is, when we use 
possibility distributions as valuations. This is mainly due to the looser contraints 
imposed by possibility theory. For instance, the values in the last column of the 
inner case (Table 2) can be read as follows: "When there is an instantaneous alarm, 
the possibility that L1 is ok is extremely weak, whatever the state of S1; on the 
other hand, it is completely possible that L 1 is faulty, both with S1 ok or faulty." 
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Table 4. Prior Values 
ok inst del 
p(.) 0.998 0.001 0.001 
FI(.) 1 1 1 
bel(.) 0 0 0 
Finally, in the belief function case (Table 3), we represent the bits of our infor- 
mation as multiple basic mass assignments, which are then combined by Pulcinella 
into one mass assignment using Dempster's rule. 4 The three mass assignments 
used for the outer circuit breakers are meant o encode the following beliefs, which 
are a way to interpret the expert's tatements reported in Section 2.1: 
(i) A 0.9 belief that when there is no alarm the lines are ok, and vice versa; this 
is captured by assigning a 0.9 mass to the set of all possible configurations 
except hose where we receive an alarm but the lines are both ok, and those 
where there is a fault but we do not receive an alarm (since we are ignorant 
about how to distribute the remaining 0.1, we follow the usual procedure for 
belief functions and allocate it to the full set of hypotheses expressing the 
fact that everything is possible to some degree). 
(ii) A 0.7 belief that if there is an instantaneous alarm, L1 is faulty; this is 
expressed by a 0.7 mass on the set of all configurations, except hose where 
we receive an instantaneous alarm but L 1 is not faulty (along with 0.3 to the 
full set, again due to ignorance). 
(iii) A 0.3 belief that when there is a delayed alarm, then either L 1 or S 1 is faulty 
(i.e., we only exclude the case D1 = del & L1 = ok & S1 = ok). 
Things are similar for the inner breakers, except hat there is no way to discriminate 
between S1 being ok or faulty--hence we omit the third mass assignment. 
We also have prior values for state of the breakers before any report is received 
(Table 4). In the cases of both possibility theory and belief unctions, these values 
indicate total ignorance about he possible state of the breaker (everything is pos- 
sible, but nothing is positively believed); that is, we are agnostic about whether 
certain alarms (or no alarms) are a priori more likely than others. 5 This contrasts 
with the probability case, where the axiom p(x) + p(- ,x)  = 1 forces us to commit 
to ~x whatever credibility is not committed to x; here, we use a rough estimate of 
the priors given by the experts. 
A comparison ofthese three methods for handling the uncertainty inthe problem 
is given by elsewhere [ 19, 20]. In the rest of this paper we will investigate whether 
these models of uncertainty correctly encode the behavior described in Section 2.1. 
4The combined assignments arefairly intricate, and are not shown (but see [ 19]). 
5 The last row is the result of using a vacuous basic mass assignment as prior, in other words one where 
all the mass is given to the full set. 
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3. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM 
When we find new evidence about the state of the circuit breakers, we update 
our prior values for fault hypotheses to take account of the evidence. 
This takes the form of finding new values for, say, the probability of a line fault 
given that we have an increase in the probability of a delayed alarm (because we 
have evidence that one has occurred). Thus we determine the change in probability 
of a line fault given the change in probability of a delayed alarm. When using 
probability, or any other theory of uncertainty, we are interested in the new value 
obtained after updating. When verifying the behavior of the model, however, we 
are interested in checking that it corresponds tothat described by the domain expert 
whose knowledge is captured in the model. Thus, since the expert's knowledge 
is often expressed in the form "if we observe A, then B is more likely," we 
may be more interested in knowing the way in which the values change than 
in the values themselves. Techniques of sensitivity analysis are sometimes used 
to provide this sort of verification for parametric models. Unfortunately, these 
techniques tend to be fairly complex, and they have only been extensively studied 
for the case of probabilistic models. In this section, we establish a qualitative 
method for sensitivity analysis that can be applied to probability, possibility, and 
belief function models. That is, we provide a method by which it is possible to 
determine in a qualitative way how the values of hypotheses change when we have 
new evidence. 
The basic method underlying the analysis has been expounded elsewhere ([9], 
and for binary variables [10]), and here we merely apply the results obtained 
there. However, for those unfamiliar with this work, we provide the following 
sketch. Given the equations that relate two uncertainty values vail and val2, we 
can establish an expression, in terms of numerical uncertainty values, for the 
derivative dvalt/dval2 that relates the two quantities. This expression allows us 
to determine the qualitative value of the derivative (indicated by the use of square 
brackets), that is, whether the derivative is positive, negative, or zero. A positive 
derivative, written as [dvall/dval2] = [+], means that vall increases when val2 
increases and decreases when val2 decreases. Similarly, a negative derivative, 
[dvall/dval2] = [ - ] ,  means that vail decreases when valz increases and increases 
when val2 decreases. Finally, a zero derivative, [dvall/dval2] = [0] means that 
Vall does not change when val2 increases or decreases. Thus when we have new 
evidence that changes the value of val2 the derivative tells us the change in Vall, 
and for a full analysis we need to establish [dval(h)/dval(e)] for every interesting 
hypothesis h and piece of evidence . 
3.1. The Representation for the Qualitative Analysis 
The valuation system representation introduced above is that in which the orig- 
inal problem was formulated and solved [19, 20], and it is possible to perform the 
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Figure 3. The causal network representation fthe electricity distribution problem. 
qualitative analysis directly on this representation, since it contains the relevant 
data. However, since our previous work on qualitative analysis of uncertainty han- 
dling formalisms has been discussed using a causal network representation, it is 
helpful to reformulate the problem in such a representation. We use a network rep- 
resentation, similar to that of Pearl [ 1 ] with the exception that the numerical values 
of the dependencies are encoded in possibility [21] and evidence [22] theories as 
well as probability theory. In these networks, two nodes representing particular 
variables are joined by an arc if and only if the value of the variable represented 
by the node at one end of the arc is directly influenced by the value of the vari- 
able represented by the node at the other end of the arc. The direction of the arc 
is normally taken to represent the direction of the causal influence between the 
variables. Thus the problem information of Section 2.1 may be represented by the 
network of Figure 3. 
In the qualitative analysis we will look at changes in value of S1 and Li given 
changes in value of Di or D 1 i. If we wanted to assess the effects of several alarms 
we could sum the effects of the individual alarms using qualitative arithmetic [23]. 
3.2. The Probability Case 
Figure 3 gives the causal network relating the causes of the different types 
of alarm, viz. faults in the lines and busbars, and their effects, viz. the alarms 
generated by the breakers. We can analyze this network to relate changes in the 
probabilities of alarms to the probabilities of faults. In particular, we can write 
the partial derivatives of the probability of a line fault by the probability of the 
different alarms [9], for instance: 
Op(Li = fault) 
= p(L i  = fault  I D = inst) ,  (3 .1)  
Op(D = inst)  
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where D stands for both Di and Dli. Analogous results may be obtained for 
other alarm conditions. Now, this derivative tells us how p(Li = fault) varies with 
p(D = inst), ignoring the effects of changes in the probability of other values of 
D. We can also determine the total derivatives, which tell us, for instance, how 
p(Li = fault) varies when p(D = inst) changes, taking into account the changes 
in p(D = del) and p(D = ok) [9, 10]: 
I dp( Li = fault) ]
dp(DG ~ = [p(Li = fault I D = inst) - p(Li = fault I D = del)] 
[p(Li = fault r D = inst) - p(Li = fault I D = ok)]. 
(3.2) 
Note that this result assumes that changes in p(D = inst) are distributed between 
p(D = del) and p(D = ok) as a result of the fact that all three values sum 
to one. Again, analogous results may be obtained for other alarm states. Now, 
since 
p(Li = ok) + p(Li = fault) = 1 (3.3) 
for any line, when we know how p (Li = fault) changes we can tell how p (Li = ok) 
changes. These results are true for both inner and outer circuit breakers, and 
furthermore are true for any numerical values we put into the model. We can 
repeat he calculation for the probability of a busbar failure obtaining analogous 
results. 
The overall change in probability of line and busbar faults due to a change in 
the probability of an alarm from a single circuit breaker can be calculated either 
from the partial derivatives, or the total derivatives. For example, the change in 
probability of a fault in L 1 given a change in the state of D 1 may be calculated as 
or as 
F Op(L 1 = fault) ]
[Ap(L1 = fault)] = L~- i  ----i-n~st) ® [AptD1 = inst)] 
F ap L1 = fault)] 
• LO~- -  l - -~ j  ® [Ap(D I  = del)] 
I Op(L 1 --fault) 
@ L ap(D1 = ok) @ [Ap(D1 = ok)] (3.4) 
dp(L1 -- fault)] 
[Ap(L1 = fault)] = Ld -~ l  = inst) J ® [Ap(D1 = inst)], (3.5) 
where ® and @ are qualitative multiplication and addition (Table 5) respec- 
tively. Note that in the second equation we could use the derivative with respect 
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to any of the values of D. Note also that the derivatives cannot take arbi- 
trary (qualitative) values, but are constrained to obey the laws of probability. 
Namely, the normalization condition (3.3) given above ensures that the deriva- 
tive [Op(Li = fault)/Op(D)] may be calculated as [ - ]  ® [Op(Li = ok)/Op(D)] 
and [0p(S1 = fault)/Op(D)] = [ - ]  ® [Op(S1 = ok)/Op(D)] for any value of D. 
These constraints hold whatever numerical values are used in the model. Thus, 
irrespective of the way in which a piece of evidence affects the probability of a 
line or busbar fault, it will influence the probability of the component being ok in 
the opposite way. 
3.3. The Possibility Case 
Possibility theory is essentially qualitative [24] when it relies on maximum 
and minimum operations to determine the updating of values, numbers being 
used simply as a convenient and easily comprehensible s t of suitably ordered 
values. The use of the max and rain operations makes it impossible to obtain true 
derivatives, but a form of derivative based on small finite, rather than infinitesimal, 
change may be established [9]. Using the results established there, we can predict 
that: 
[ 5 FI (Li = fault) ] 
,~n(D ~ l  = [+1 
if I-I*(D = inst) < l-I(Li = fault I D = inst) 
and l-I(Li = fault, D = inst) > FI(Li = fault, D :~ inst), (3.6) 
where I-I* (.) is the possibility once some information is received from the alarms. 6 
Otherwise the derivative has the value [0]. Similar expressions will relate changes 
in FI(Li = fault) to those in I-I(D = del) and FI(D = ok). 
We can also chart the behavior of the possibility of the line being ok. In (nor- 
malized) possibility theory this is only connected to the possibility of line fault by 
the relation 
max(F l (L i  = ok), I-[(Li = fault))  = 1, (3.7) 
6The fact that we know how the possibility values change allows us to make more precise predictions 
than is generally the case [9]. 
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so that one of the two must be perfectly possible. Thus when no fault is observed, 
it must be perfectly possible that the line is ok, and vice versa. However, unlike 
the probability case, in general we are not able to determine how the possibility 
of the line being ok changes when we know how the possibility of the line being 
faulty changes. As a result, we have to separately determine how the possibility 
of a line being ok changes with knowledge of alarms: 
if 
and 
61-I(D = inst) = [+] 
FI*(D = inst) < FI(Li = ok I D = inst) 
1-I(Li = ok, D ---- inst) > FI(Li = ok, D ¢ inst). (3.8) 
Again similar expressions will relate changes in FI(Li = ok) to those in FI(D ----- 
del) and I-I (D = ok). Furthermore, we can relate changes in the possibility of bus- 
bar failure, and of the busbar being ok, to instantaneous alarm, delayed alarm, and 
no alarm. Now, the difference xpressions such as [~ FI (Li = fault)/~ FI (D = inst)] 
that we are using are partial in that they only take account of changes with respect 
to one possibility. As a result, we calculate the change in possibility of a line fault 
given information about alarms using 
r3F[(Li = fault)] 
[AF I (L i  = fault)] = L 61-](D-- ~ ® [An(D = inst)] 
[ n = fault) 1 ¢L~-~- -  ~- ®[AFI(D=del)] 
(~r6FI(Li = fault)] [ ® An(D=ok)l, (3.9) 
and changes in the possibilities of the line being oR and of the busbar being both 
ok and faulty may be calculated in an analogous way. As noted above, the nor- 
malization condition only weakly restricts the way possibility values change-- i t  
only prevents all the values of some variable from having a possibility of less than 
one at the same time, and this requirement does not greatly restrict he qualitative 
derivatives. 
3.4. The Belief Function Case 
Once again we can use the results of [9] to determine the qualitative behavior 
of the belief function model of the distribution etwork. Since we are dealing 
with belief functions, D may take any value in the power set of {inst, del, ok}, so 
D E {inst, del, ok, inst U del, inst U ok, del U ok, inst U del U ok}, where we write 
inst for {inst}, del for {dell, and ok for {ok} for notational simplicity. As in the 
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probability case, we can write down either partial derivatives of the form 
3bel(Li = fault) 
= bel(Li = fault D = inst) (3.10) 
Obel(D = inst) 
or more useful total derivatives uch as dbel(Li = fault)/dbel(D = inst), which 
give changes in bel(Li = fault) that also take into account changes that take place 
in bel(D = del) and bel(D = ok). For the alarm situations that we are interested 
in, we have, for instance, 
dbel(Li = fault) 
[bel(Li I D = inst) - min bel(Li = fault L X)] 
k X J 
~ [bel(Li = fault I D = inst) - maxbel(Li = fault I X)] ,  (3.11) 
L X J 
where X __ {D = inst, D = deI, D = ok},D = inst ~ X. Obviously we 
have analogous results for other alarm types, and similar results about the busbar 
may be deduced. As in the probability case, the derivatives are not theoretically 
unconstrained, but since in Dempster-Shafer theory there is only a very weak link 
between the belief in, say, a line being ok and its being faulty: 
bel(Li = ok) + bel(Li = fault) < 1, (3.12) 
there are, in practice, no restrictions on the qualitative values of the derivatives, 
indicating that, in qualitative terms, belief functions are a generalization of both 
probability and possibility theories. 
3.5. More Complex Models 
Because our case study is concerned with the analysis of a relatively simple 
model, in that there is only one arc in the causal graph between any observation 
that we can make and any hypothesis in which we are interested, it is worth 
considering how more complex models may be analyzed. In fact, the answer 
is simple. Because the results that we have used are the results of a truly local 
analysis--that is, the analysis of each arc may be carried out using just data about 
the conditional values that control the behavior of that arc- -we can simply analyze 
the model arc by arc, and then combine the results along the path from observation 
to interesting hypothesis. 
For example, if we have an observation O, a hypothesis H, and an intermediate 
variable I,  so that there is an arc from H to I and from I to O, we would analyze 
the model by determining dval(l = i j)/dval(O = oi) for every value ij of O and 
i j  of I ,  and then dval(H = ht)/dval(l = i j) for every value ht of H and ij of I. 
Then to determine the effect of an observation that has the effect of making a given 
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val(oi) increase, we would calculate the change in a given val(ht) as 
[Aval(h,)] = L dval(l = ~i) J ® L~-~ - -~i) ® [Aval(oi)l, (3.13) 
where ij is a convenient value of I. In others words, large models may be handled 
by decomposing them, analyzing the components, and combining the results in a 
modular way. 
4. VALIDATING THE BEHAVIOR OF THE MODELS 
Having now analyzed the way in which qualitative uncertainty values are prop- 
agated through the kind of network structures found in our test case, and thus 
determined the general behavior of the formalisms in which we are interested, 
we can use the numerical information of Section 2 to examine the exact behavior 
of the models we have proposed. This provides a qualitative comparison of the 
different formalisms for our problem, as well as predicting how the quantitative 
formalisms will behave. 
The way new information coming from a circuit breaker is incorporated in the 
model is different for the three formalisms considered. In probability theory, the 
information that a particular alarm has arrived from a breaker is typically introduced 
by increasing the value for the associated state, at the expense of the values of the 
alternative states: for example, a report of an instantaneous alarm is encoded by 
forcing Ap(D = inst) = [+], Ap(D = del) = [ - ] ,  and Ap(D = ok) = [ - ] .  
In Dempster-Shafer theory, an alarm report is encoded by simply increasing the 
value of the associated state (the values of alternative states do not need to be 
decreased, as they are initially 0), so a report of an instantaneous alarm is encoded 
by Abel(D = inst) = [+], Abel(D = del) = [0], and Abel(D = ok) = [0]. 
Possibility theory differs in that an alarm report is not encoded by increasing the 
possibility value (which is what we are measuring) ofthat alarm, but by decreasing 
the possibility of all other alarm conditions, so that for an instantaneous alarm 
AFI(D = inst) = [0], AFI(D = del) = [ - ] ,  and AFI(D = ok) = [ - ] .  
4.1. The Probability Case 
The analysis of Section 3.2 told us which conditional probabilities determine 
the behavior of the system. Now, from Table 1 we can see that for the inner circuit 
breakers we have 
p(Li = faul t ,  S l  = fau l t  ] Dli = inst )  = 0 .01 ,  
p(Li = faul t ,  $1  = fau l t  ] Dli = de l )  = 0 .01 ,  
p(Li =fau l t ,  S1 = fau l t [  Dl i=ok)  =0.05 ,  
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p(Li = fault, S1 = ok I Dli = inst) = 0.89, 
p(Li = fault, S1 = ok [ Dli = del) = 0.89, 
p(Li=fault, S1 = ok lD l i=ok)  =0.05 ,  
so that p(Li = fault I Dli = inst) = 0.90, p(Li = fault I Dli = del) = 0.90, and 
p(Li = fault [ Dli = ok) = 0.01. Using these values in (3.2), we find that the 
qualitative values of the derivatives that link the probabil i ty of a line fault to that 
of an alarm for the inner circuit breakers are 
dp(Li =_!ault) 1 
dp(Dli = inst)J  = [+] '  
dp(Li .----_fault) ] 
dp(Dli = del) J  = [+] '  
dp(Li = fault) 1 
d--p-~l i  - -~]  = 
[ -] .  
Now, from our knowledge of the prior probabil i ty values we can see that when we 
have an instantaneous alarm the change in the probabi l i ty of a line fault calculated 
by (3.5) is 
Report None inst del ok 
[Ap(Li = fault)] [0] [+]  [+]  [--]  
In both these cases, the probabil i ty of the line being ok, p(Li = ok) may be 
calculated from 1 - p(Li = fault), and thus varies inversely to p(Li = fault). For 
the outer circuit breakers 
dp(Li  = fau,t) l 
dp(Di ~--53  = [+] '  L dp(Di = del)  J = [71' 
[ p(Li r_!au t)] 
dp(Di ---- ok) J = [ - ] '  
where the [?] indicates that it is not possible to establish whether the value of the 
derivative is positive, negative, or zero. Thus we have 
Report None inst del ok 
[Ap(Li = fault)] [0] [+]  [?] [ - -]  
Here the [?] indicates that we cannot predict precisely whether the probabi l i ty 
of a line fault wil l  increase, decrease, or not change based on purely qualitative 
information [the same result will also be obtained from (3.4) if we use the partial 
derivatives derived from (3.1)]. However, it is possible to heuristically refine the 
prediction using some numerical order of magnitude information. For instance, 
taking the quantitative xpressions from (3.1) and the relevant condit ional values 
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and comparing them with the values of the partial derivatives, we find that 
Op(Li = fault) Op(Li = fault) Op(Li = fault) 
> >> 
Op(Di = inst) Op(Di = del) Op(Di = ok) ' 
where >> indicates a difference of at least an order of magnitude. Now, from the 
prior probabilities we know that when a delayed alarm takes place IAp(Di = 
ok)l ~ IAp(Di = del)[ >> JAp(Di = inst)[, since the changes in p(Di = ok) 
and p(Di = del) are around a thousand times that in p(Di = inst). Thus when 
evaluating (3.4) to establish the change in line fault probability for a delayed alarm, 
the second term dominates, and we have [Ap(Li = fault)] = [+]. Overall, 
Report None inst del ok 
[Ap(Li = fault)] [01 [+] [+] [ - ]  
and the outer circuit breakers work as intended, with the probability of failure of 
the line increasing with instantaneous and delayed alarms. Thus for both inner and 
outer breakers, the probability of the line being ok falls with both instantaneous 
and delayed alarms, and the model is an accurate representation f the behavior 
of the target system. Now, considering busbar faults, for the inner circuit breakers 
we have 
[ dp(Sl =_!ault) l =[_] ' [dp(Sl_=_fault)] dp(Dli = inst)J Ldp(Dli = del) = [ - ] '  
dp(S1 = fault) ] 
o- j = [+] '  
Report None inst del ok 
[Ap(S1 = faul t ) ]  [0]  [ - ]  [ - ]  [+] 
This means that if we have a report of any kind of alarm in the inner breakers, then 
the probability of a busbar fault decreases, while knowing for sure that there is no 
alarm means that the probability of failure increases. This behavior is rather odd, 
since we would expect knowledge of an alarm to increase the probability of a fault, 
and a no-alarm report o decrease the probability of a fault. We will consider this 
strange behavior again in Section 5. Finally, for the outer circuit breakers we have 
I dp(Sl : fau l t ) ]  =[? ] ,  [dp(S1 : fau l t ) ]  dp(Di = inst) J L dp(Di = del) J = [ - ] '  
dp(Sl = fault) ] 
j = [ - ] '  
and the purely qualitative approach gives 
Report None inst del ok 
[Ap(S1 = fault)] [0] [?] [+1 [ - ]  
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This time order of magnitude considerations cannot help us, and in order to resolve 
the qualitative ambiguity, we will have to carry out a full numerical calculation us- 
ing Pulcinella. When this is done, we find, as we would hope, that an instantaneous 
alarm will cause the probability of a busbar fault to increase. Overall we have 
Report None inst del ok 
[Ap(S1 = fault)] [0] [+] [+] [ -1 
which are much as we would expect. 
4.2. The Possibility Case 
For the case in which the model is quantified using possibility values we find 
that because the derivatives depend upon the final possibility values of the alarm 
states, FI*(D ---- inst), I I*(D = del), and 1-I*(D = ok) (3.6), we have different 
values for different pieces of evidence. For an instantaneous or delayed alarm we 
have 
[o], [o], 
~I- I (D i--~st) J = L SFI(D = del) 
[ ~l-I(Li -fao,,) l al - I (D = ok) _l = [0], 
whi le  for no alarm we have 
inst) ---- [+]' L ~ - -~ -- [+]' 
,FI(Li = fault) ] 
aFI(D =ok)  =[0] ,  
so that from (3.9), 
Report None inst del ok 
[Al l(L/  = fault)] 101 10] [0] 1--1 
and the model behaves as expected. If there is an instantaneous or delayed alarm 
on either the inner or outer breakers, a line fault remains perfectly possible. If 
there is no alarm, the possibility of a line fault falls. We can also consider how the 
possibility of the line being ok changes. We find that for both types of breaker, for 
all alarm states, 
al - I (D = inst)_] = [0], Lan(D = del) = [01, 
[ ~n(L i -  ok) l 
aFI(D = ok) J = [+] '  
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which gives 
Report None inst del ok 
JAil(L/ = ok)] [0] [ - ]  [ - ]  [0] 
So, for both instantaneous and delayed alarms in both inner and outer breakers, 
the possibil ity of the line being ok will fall. Thus the possibil ity of the line being 
ok does not change 7 as long as there is no alarm on either type of breaker, but 
falls as soon as we have any kind of alarm. Similar results may be obtained for 
the possibilities that the busbar has a fault or is ok. It is clear that we can derive 
conditions imilar .'o those of (3.6) and (3.8) to predict how the possibility of the 
busbar being faulty depends upon the possibilitites of the different ypes of alarm. 
We find that for the outer breakers we have 
~FI(Di = inst)J = [0], L ~--~-Di --~d~el) = [o1, 
31-I($1 _=_fault)] 
8FI(Di ----- ok) = [0], 
for instantaneous and delayed alarms, while the case of no alarm gives us 
[SFI(S1 ~ fault) ISFI(S1 = fault) 
8I-I(Di = inst)1 = [+]' L ~i  :d-~ ] : [+] '  
1 31-I (S1 ~ !ault) ]81-I(Di = ok) = [0], 
and for the inner breakers we have, for all alarm states, 
~r I (D l i  = inst) = [0], L~-~- i i  ~-~el ) J  = [0], 
I ,SFI(S1 = fault) ] Tfi -ff17 j = [o]. 
Thus from the analogous result to (3.8), for the outer breakers we get 
Report None inst del ok 
[AFI(S1 =fault)] [0] [01 [0] [-1 
7Notice that the values of both FI(Li = fault) and FI(Li = ok) are initially 1. As was the case for 
the assignment ofpriors to circuit breaker states, possibility theory (as well as belief unctions--see 
below) allows us to remain agnostic about whether afault is a priori more likely than no fault. This is 
again not the case for probability theory, due to the additivity axiom. 
Qualitative Verification and Debugging 205 
while for the inner breakers we get 
Report None inst dol ok 
[AFI(S1 = fault)l [0] [0] [0] [0] 
So, when the possibility of instantaneous and delayed alarms in the outer breakers 
increases, the possibility of the busbar being faulty will not fall, but this possibility 
is independent of that of an alarm in the inner breakers. In a similar way, we can 
determine how the possibility of the busbar being ok will vary. The reader should 
by now be able to perform all the computations unaided, so we only indicate the 
results--for the outer circuit breakers 
Report 
[AI-[(SI = ok)] 
and for the inner circuit breakers 
Report 
[AFI(SI = ok)] 
None inst del ok 
[0] [0] [--I [0] 
None inst del ok 
[0l [0] [0] [0] 
As we would expect, only the detection of a delayed alarm on the outer breakers 
suggests that the possibility of the busbar being ok should fall, while a no-alarm 
state on the inner breakers will cause the possibility to change. In conclusion, the 
qualitative behavior of the model developed using possibility theory corresponds 
to our expectations given the domain knowledge. 
4.3. The Belief Function Case 
The belief function case is rather different to the others in that the values given 
in Section 2 do not correspond to those needed in (3.10) and (3.11) to establish 
the qualitative values of the derivatives. Instead we have to extract he condi- 
tional beliefs from the joint mass assignment given in Section 2.2. In order to 
compute the mass distribution of, say, L1 and S1 given that D1 = del, that is, 
bel(L 1, S 1 I D 1 = del), we just consider all the second rows in the joint distri- 
butions (those corresponding to DI = del), and combine them in the usual way 
for belief functions [4]. Thus, for the outer set of circuit breakers we compute the 
value ofbel(L1,  S1 I D1 = del) as [0.9 x (0.7 + 0.3) x 0.7] + [0.9 x (0.7 + 
0.3) x 0.3] + [0.1 x (0.7 + 0.3) x 0.3)]. The full set of conditional assignments 
over Li and S1 is shown in Figure 4, where, for instance, the second row of the 
"Inner circuit breaker" column gives us bel(Li, S1 I Dl i  = del) for the various 
values of S1 and any Li. Similarly, the first row of the "Outer circuit breaker" 
column gives us the values ofbel(Li ,  SI [ Di = ok). 
From this we can establish that for the inner circuit breakers bel(Li = ok I Dl i  
= ok) = 0.9, bel(Li = fault I Dl i  = del) = 0.9, andbel(L i  = fault I Dli  
= inst) = 0.97, while for the outer circuit breakers, bel(Li = ok N S 1 = ok [ Di = 
ok) = 0.9, bel(Li = faultUSl = fault [ Di = del) = 0.93, bel(Li = fault U S1 = 
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F igure 4. Conditional belief functions for the "alarm" relations. 
fault r Di = inst) = 0.27, bel(Li = fault I Di = inst) = 0.7, and all o ther  
cond i t iona l  bel iefs  are zero. 8 F rom bel(Li = ok A S1 = ok [ Di = ok) = 0.9 
we know that  bel(Li = ok I Di = ok) ~ 0.9 and bel(S1 = ok [ Di = ok) > 0.9. 
F rom (3.11)  we learn that  for the inner  c i rcui t  b reakers  we have 
1 ~ i  ~ = [+] '  Ldbel(Dli = de l ) J  = [+] '  
dbel(Li y__fault)] 
dbel(Dli = ok) = [0], 
wh i le  for  the outer  c i rcui t  breakers  
dbel(Li = fau,t) l Fdbel(Li-:au,,~ l 
db--~D-i  ~ i-~st) _J = [+] '  L dbel(Di = del) .] = [0], 
[ dbel( Li --__ffault) ] 
dbel(Di = ok) = [0]. 
When we have ev idence  of  an ins tantaneous  a larm,  and be l ie f  in an ins tantaneous  
a la rm thus increases,  there is no change in be l ie f  in a de layed  a la rm or no a larm.  
Wi th  this  knowledge we can pred ic t  that  the mode l  behaves  as it should.  Indeed,  
for  the inner  c i rcu i t  b reakers  we have 
Report None inst del ok 
[Abel(Li = fault)] [0] [+] [+] [0] 
wh i le  for  the outer  c i rcui t  breakers  
Report None inst del ok 
[Abel(Li = fault)] [0] [+] [0] [0] 
8Note that for notational simplicity we write bel(Li = ok A SI = ok I Di = ok) to denote 
bel((Li, SI) = {(ok, ok/} I Di = ok), the conditional belief that the joint variable (Li, SI) takes 
the value (ok, ok). bel(Li = fault U SI = fault I Di = inst) is used in a similar way. 
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Thus, if there is an instantaneous ordelayed alarm from the inner breakers, belief 
in a line fault increases. An instantaneous alarm from the outer breakers also 
increases belief in a line fault, but a delayed alarm does not affect this belief. 
Knowing that there is no alarm from the breakers does not affect belief in a line 
fault. These behaviors do not exactly match the specifications in Section 2 - -  
namely, we were expecting bel(Li = fault) to increase in response to a delayed 
alarm in an outer breaker. A similar phenomenon appears in other cases, and we 
will discuss it in the next section. Using (3.11) to predict how belief in the line 
being ok changes, we find that for both inner and outer circuit breakers, 
'F dbel(Li = ok) l F dbel(Li = o.) l 
L ~  -in-~st)J = [0], L ~  - d--~J = [0], 
dbel(Li = ok) l  
dbel(O Z ~ J = [+] '  
from which we know 
Report None inst del ok 
[Abel(Li = ok)] [0] [0] [0] [+] 
So, for both instantaneous and delayed alarms in both inner and outer breakers, our 
belief in the line being ok is unchanged, but this belief will increase when we have 
evidence that there is no alarm. Similar results may be established for the busbar. 
Since all the relevant conditional values are zero except bel(S 1 = ok I D = ok), 
the only derivative relevant to the busbar that is nonzero is 
dbel(Sl -- ok)]  
dbel(Di ---- ok)J -- [+] 
for the outer breakers, meaning that, when we look at how the beliefs change, we 
find that for the inner breakers 
Report 
[Abel(S1 = fault)] 
lAbel(S1 = ok)] 
while for the outer breakers 
Report 
[Abel(S1 = fault)] 
[Abel(S1 = ok)] 
None inst del ok 
[o] [o] [o] [o] 
[o] [o] [o] [o] 
None inst del ok 
[0] [0] [0] [0l 
[0] [0] [0] [+] 
Thus, belief in the busbar failing or being ok is insensitive to anything happening 
on the inner breakers, as well as to instantaneous and delayed faults on the outer 
breaker. Belief in the busbar being ok increases when it is known that there is no 
fault on the outer breaker, which is the only one that points to the busbar. Overall, 
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the belief function model of the alarm system behaves largely as one would expect 
on reading the description in Section 2, with the exception of the anomaly described 
above--belief in a fault in the busbar does not increase with belief in a delayed 
alarm in an outer breaker. 
4.4. Discussion of Verification 
The main result that emerges from this section is that we have shown how the 
qualitative analysis may be used to validate the quantitative model. It can do 
this because it is possible to make qualitative predictions of the behavior of the 
quantitative model using the numerical values. This qualitative prediction may be 
compared against he original opinion of the domain expert o determine whether 
the quantitative model has captured the expert's knowledge. We emphasize that 
this technique is analytic rather than experimental, and can be carried out for 
formalisms other than probability theory. The usefulness of our technique is 
highlighted by the fact that it threw up some anomalies in the quantitative model that 
we were using (these are examined in the next section). In other words, the initial 
valuation system model, with values as ascertained by the knowledge ngineer, 
does not behave quite as might be expected from the description of its intended 
behavior that is supplied in Section 2. Since the validation is purely qualitative, 
the extent of any anomalies cannot be predicted without performing a numerical 
calculation. The fact that the validation is purely qualitative also means that there 
are circumstances under which it gives ambiguous results. Sometimes these can 
be resolved using a form of order of magnitude reasoning (which is formalised 
in [25]), and sometimes it is necessary to carry out a numerical calculation to tell 
exactly what happens. 
5. DEBUGGING THE VALUES 
The qualitative analysis of the probabilistic model of the distribution etwork 
revealed that any alarm on an inner circuit breaker will cause the probability 
of busbar failure to decrease, whilst the observation of "no alarm" will actually 
cause the probability of busbar failure to increase. This kind of behavior was 
a considerable surprise to the knowledge ngineer who performed the original 
clicitation, and it was certainly not intended when the original model was built. 
Furthermore, because it was so unexpected, it is unlikely that such behavior would 
have been exposed without the qualitative analysis. Now that the anomaly has 
been spotted, we can run Pulcinella over the specific data, and the quantitative 
data can be examined to evaluate the effect of the discrepancy. In this case we find 
Report None inst del ok 
p(SI = fault) 0.000175 0.000088 0.000088 0.000176 
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This makes it clear that the change of value is so small that it is probably not 
worth bothering with. However, even though the values are small, the fact that the 
behavior is reversed for all the possible states of the breaker may induce us to try 
to debug it. 
A second anomaly was detected in the belief function model. This occurs in 
the system's response to delayed alarms from the outer breakers--such analarm 
should, according to the specifications in Section 2.1, increase belief both in a 
busbar fault and in a fault in the line that the breaker is on. However, in the model 
no such effects are observed, with the alarm failing to change any of these beliefs. 
In fact, running Pulcinella on this scenario yields the following results for the outer 
circuit breakers: 
Report None inst del ok 
bel(Li = fault) 0 0.98 0 0 
After some thought, however, what could have been seen as a bug in the model 
turns out to be acceptable behavior. In the case of a delayed alarm in an outer 
breaker, say D1, the belief function model makes the belief in the event "fault in 
L 1 OR S 1" increase; however, this belief is not committed to either of the two fault 
events individually. 9 This should not to be seen as a loss of inferential power--the 
arrival of subsequent items of evidence (i.e., the receipt of new alarm reports) 
will disambiguate he situation. To see this, suppose that a new delayed alarm is 
received from D3. This supports the hypothesis "fault in L3 OR SI," and the two 
pieces of evidence together support the hypothesis "fault in S 1 ." So for both these 
anomalies it is possible to argue that what has been detected isnot really a problem. 
However, we might wish to "correct" such behaviors o that inner circuit breaker 
alarms cause the probability of busbar failure to increase (on the grounds that there 
is an error somewhere) and delayed alarms on a single outer circuit breaker cause 
belief in busbar and line failure to increase. If we do so, we can use the qualitative 
analysis to guide us. 
5.1. A Procedure for Debugging 
The qualitative analysis tells us two things. Firstly it tells us how particular 
pieces of evidence affect the fault hypotheses and thus enables us to detect when 
the model deviates from its intended behavior. It also tells us which conditional 
values determine the qualitative behavior, and this is the key to debugging the 
mode[. We can use the analysis to identify which conditional values cause the 
unwanted behavior, which ones help to determine the correct behavior, and which 
ones do not affect either. We can then alter the values that cause the unwanted 
9 As may be seen from the fact hat he relevant conditional belief [identified by rewriting (3.11) with 
L 1 ----- fault U S 1 = fault in place of L 1 = fault] bel(L 1 = fault U S 1 = lault I D = del) = 0.93 while 
bel(L1 = fault I D = del) = bel(S1 = fault I D = del) = 0. 
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behavior but do not affect the desired behavior. To do this, the following informal 
procedure is suggested: 
1. Establish the set of incorrect derivatives by comparing the behavior of the 
model with the system behavior given by the domain expert. 
2. For every incorrect derivative, identify the set of equations that determine 
it, and for every equation e construct the corresponding set of conditionals 
C(e) that are mentioned in it. 
3. For each set C(e) so constructed, let U(e) be the set of conditionals in C(e) 
that are unused by all other equations. 
4. If U(e) is nonempty, then find a new distribution of values to the conditionals 
in it so that the correct values for the corresponding derivatives are obtained, 
and the new distribution is as close as possible to the old one. 
5. If U(e) is empty, then let U(e) be the set of conditionals in C(e) that do not 
determine any correct derivatives. 
6. Find a new distribution for the values to the conditionals in U(e) such 
that every equation which previously determined an incorrect derivative 
now produces a correct derivative, no derivatives corrected in step 4 are 
made incorrect, and the new distribution is as close as possible to the old 
one.  
7. If there are certain equations which may not be corrected in this way (be- 
cause for instance there are no conditionals in step 5 that do not help to 
determine initially correct derivatives), then identify the set of all such equa- 
tions. 
8. Find a new distribution over the full set of conditionals involved in these 
equations such that all of them now predict he correct values of the deriva- 
tives, no previously correct or corrected erivatives are made incorrect, and 
the new distribution is as close as possible to the old one. 
"As close as possible" should be interpreted relative to the judgement of the knowl- 
edge engineer, who decides how large a deviation from intended behavior can be 
tolerated, and which deviations are less tolerable than others. Of course the new 
distribution must conform to the normalization condition for the calculus the values 
are expressed in. 
5.2. Correcting the Behavior of the Probabilistic Model 
We can use this procedure to correct he behavior of the probabilistic model 
regarding the detection of busbar faults on the inner breakers. Section 4.1 gives us 
the following set of incorrect derivatives, ince every single behavior of the model 
is qualitatively incorrect: 
dp(S1 ~!ault) I dp(S1 = fault)] Fdp(S1 = fault) 
{Ldp(Dli = inst) ]' L d--p-(~-,-i ~-~-~1}" L d--P-~ i 7 ~ ~-~eO J' 
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Now,  these  are determined  by the equat ions  
dp(S1 = fault) ] 
~ / ~ i-n-~-st) J 
= [p(S1  = fault I Dli = inst) - p(S1 = fault [ Dli = del)] 
[p (S1  = fault I Dli = inst) - p(S1 = fault I Dli = ok)],  (5.1) 
E dp(Sl = fault) 1 
= [p (S1  = fault I Dli = del) - p(S1 = fault [ Dli = inst)] 
[p (S1  = fault I Dli = del) - p(S1 = fault I Dli = ok)],  (5.2) 
I dp (S 1 =_ f__ault) 1 
dp(Dli = ok) J 
---- [p (S1  ----- fault ] Dli ---- ok)  - -  p(S1 ---- fault I Dli = ins t ) ]  
[p (S1  = fau l t  I Dli = ok)  - p(S1 = fau l t  I Dli = de l ) ] .  (5 .3 )  
Now,  s ince p(S1 = fault [ Dli) = p(S1 = fault, Li = fault I Dli) + p(S1 = 
fault, Li = ok [ Dli) for any value o f  Dli, the set o f  cond i t iona ls  used by (5.1), 
(5.2), and (5.3) is (it is the same for all o f  them)  
{p(S1 = fault, Li = fault I Dli = inst),  p(S1 = fault, Li = ok I Dli = inst),  
p(S1 = fault, Li = fault [ Dli = del) ,  p(S1 = fault, Li = ok [ Dli = del) ,  
p(S1 = fault, Li = fault [ Dli = ok), p(S1 = fault, Li = ok I Dli = ok)}. 
C lear ly  all the cond i t iona ls  in each set are used in other  equat ions ,  so we have to 
look  for cond i t iona ls  that do not  he lp  to determine  current ly  correct  der ivat ives.  
S ince  cond i t iona ls  uch as p(S1 = fault, Li = fault I Dli) help  to determine  the 
current ly  correct  der ivat ives that relate p(Li = fault) to p(Dli), the cond i t iona ls  
we  are look ing  for are 
{p(S1 = fault, Li = ok I Dli = inst), 
p(S1 = fault, Li = ok [ Dli = del),  
p(S1 = fault, Li = ok I Dli = ok)}. 
We then choose  a new distr ibut ion to min imize  change,  and a br ie f  exper iment  
shou ld  suff ice to sat isfy the reader  that a sui table new distr ibut ion is 
p(S1 = fault, Li = ok I D = ok) = 0.15, 
p(S1 = fault, Li = ok I D = inst) = 0.2, 
p(S1 = fault, Li = ok I D = del) = 0.2. 
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5.3. Correcting the Behavior of the Belief Function Model 
In the belief function model, the problem is that belief in line fault and busbar 
fault does not increase when there is a delayed alarm in the outer breakers, in other 
words, [dbel(Li = fault, S1 = fault)/dbel(Di = del)] = [0] instead of [+]. Thus 
the incorrect derivative is
[ dbel(Sl__: fault_, _L/_= fau l t )  ] 
L dbel(Di = de l )  } 
And so from (3.11) we can tell, by analogy, that the relevant equation is 
dbel(Sl =fau l t ,  L / - -  fau l t ) ]  Fbel(Sl = faul t ,  Li = fau l t [  Di = inst )  
dbel(Di = de!) J k 
- -  minbel(Sl = fault, Li = fault[ X)] 
X A 
@[bel(S1 = fault, Li = fault[ Di = inst) 
- maxbel(S1 = fault, Li = fault[X)| ,  
X J 
where X c {Di = inst, Di = dol, Di = ok}, Di = del 6 X, so that the set of 
conditionals in which we are interested is
{bel(S1 = fault ,  Li = fau l t  [ Di = de l  tJ Di = inst  U Di = ok) ,  
bel(S1 = faul t ,  Li = fau l t  [ Di = de l  U Di = inst ) ,  
bel(S1 = fault ,  Li = fau l t  ] Di = de l  U Di = ok) ,  
bel(S1 = fault ,  Li = fau l t  [ Di = de l )} .  
None of these conditional values is used in any other equation, so that any of the 
conditional values may be changed without altering other derivatives. In addition, 
all the relevant conditionals are currently zero, so that [dbel(Li -- fault, S1 = 
fault) [ dbel(Di = del)] may be made positive by making bel(Li = fault, S1 = 
fault [ Di = de[) positive while leaving all other relevant conditionals unchanged. 
This may be achieved by adding another belief function to the basic probability 
assignment of Section 2.2 so that we have the basic belief assignments of Figure 5. 
Note that the change in distribution here is not strictly minimal, since setting 
the mass of the new basic probability assignment to 0.0000.. .  01 would have 
sufficed to make the relevant derivative positive. However, it seemed reasonable 
to our knowledge ngineer to change the distribution to a value that generates a 
significant change in bel(Li = fault, SI = fault) given the evidence of a delayed 
alarm. 
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Figure 5. The new joint belief distribution. 
5.4. System Behavior  after Debugging 
Having made the changes outlined in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, we can test the 
behavior of the new models. First consider the probabilistic model. Entering the 
new conditional values into Pulcinella nd propagating, we obtain, for alarms in 
the inner circuit breaker, 
Report None inst del ok 
p(S 1 = fault) 0.000007 0.00004 0.0006 0.000006 
So an alarm now causes the probability ofbusbar failure to increase, and the system 
has had the "bug" removed. Similarly, for the belief function model, we have for 
the outer breaker 
Report None inst del ok 
bel(S1 = fault) 0 0 0.09 0 
bel(Li = fault) 0 0 0,09 0 
which corrects the "bug" detected in the original behavior by relating a delayed 
alarm from an outer breaker with an increase in the belief in a fault in the busbar 
and line. Notice that the behavior for all the other cases remains unchanged. 
6. SUMMARY 
This paper has investigated one of the uses of reasoning about qualitative changes 
in uncertainty value in the context of a real world problem. We have illustrated 
214 Simon Parsons and Alessandro Saffiotti 
our approach to the qualitative analysis of quantitative models of uncertainty [9] 
by analyzing the behavior of three models that had been built to diagnose faults 
in an electricity distribution etwork. As the analysis is conducted on a local 
basis, the proposed approach should scale well to larger problems--we can simply 
analyze the model arc by arc, and then combine the results along the path from 
observation to interesting hypothesis. The number of steps in the analysis is only 
dependent upon the number of arcs in the network, and the computational effort 
to calculate their effect is quadratic in the number of nodes [26]. This analysis 
is useful because it provides a way of determining the behavior of a model at a 
high level of abstraction. As such it relies on weak information and produces 
results that, although correct, may at times be too weak to be useful. As a result 
we enriched the purely qualitative analysis by introducing some informal order of 
magnitude r asoning which gave stronger results. It should be noted that this form 
of reasoning, like any other kind of order of magnitude reasoning, is essentially 
heuristic, and may at times cause errors. However, such problems can often be 
avoided, especially if the order of magnitude reasoning is formalized [25]. Of 
course, it is also possible to resolve overly weak results in other ways--most 
obviously by running numerical simulations in the relevant places. 
Having performed the analysis, we then used the results to predict he behavior 
of models built using all three uncertainty formalisms. This made it easy to check 
the behavior of the models against he behavior which the knowledge ngineer 
who originally elicited the information intended them to have. In particular we 
checked the way in which the value of a fault hypothesis changed as single pieces 
of evidence were observed. As a result of this validation a couple of anomalies 
in behavior were discovered in which the value of various fault hypotheses did 
not change as expected. After a discussion of the nature of these anomalies, we 
presented a procedure for removing them if desired. This procedure makes use 
of the qualitative analysis to identify which parts of the numerical model must be 
altered in order to correct he behaviors, and which parts should not be altered 
in order to prevent changing behaviors that are already correct. We then applied 
this procedure to correct he anomalies, and were able to demonstrate hat after 
correction the models behaved as they were originally intended to do. 
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